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JURISDICTION
The Respondent accepts the assertion of jurisdiction in this
court made by the Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The Respondent accepts the statement of the nature of the proceeding made by the Appellant.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is Empire entitled to reimbursement from Weyerhaeuser in

its own right, as well as as assignor of the rights of Wilson?
2.

Was Empire's claim against Weyerhaeuser filed within the

time allowed by the applicable statute of limitation?
3.

Did Wilson have any obligation to make payments on a

nonexistent deed of trust?
4.

Did Weyerhaeuser fail to prove that it was entitled to an

offset against the amount owing to Empire?
5.

Were indispensable or real parties in interest absent from

the litigation in the lower court?
6.

Did Empire prove its allegations against Weyerhaeuser?

7.

Is Empire entitled to attorneys1 fees expended in executing

the judgment against Weyerhaeuser?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated.
Within six years—Mesne profits of real property - Instrument
in writing - Distribution of criminal proceeds to victim.
1

Within six years.
(1)

An action for the mesne profits of real property.

(2)

An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded

upon an instrument, in writing, except those mention in Section 7812-22.
(3)

An action instituted under Section 78-11-12.5 regarding

distribution of criminal proceeds to any victim.
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.

If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be

made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would ren-

der the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the
action.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the latter part of 1982 Empire, the Plaintiff in this action,
was selected as the escrow agent for a sale of a parcel of property in
American Fork Utah.
"Wilson."

The seller was "Scott" and the buyer was

As part of the sales agreement, Wilson was to assume

Scottfs obligations under a deed of trust to Weyerhaeuser.

(The ac-

tion holder of the deed of trust was Mason McDuffee-a company
that had been wholly purchased by Weyerhaeuser.

For purposes of

this case no distinction was made between Weyerhaeuser and Mason
McDuffee.

All references to either party are to Weyerhaeuser.)

At Empire's request Weyerhaeuser prepared and sent to Empire a "beneficiary statement."

(Addendum "a", record on appeal p.4)

The beneficiary statement set forth the conditions under which Weyerhaeuser would accept the assumption of the obligation under the
deed of trust it covered by Wilson.

In reliance on the representa-

tions made in the beneficiary statement, Empire tendered its check
in the amount of $5,473.04 to Weyerhaeuser.
Weyerhaeuser cashed the check and retains the funds.
Wilson, the purchaser, received a deed from the Scotts for the
property.

At the time of the sale and attempted assumption, and

prior thereto, the property in question was occupied by a tenant of
the Scotts named Papworth.

At no time did Mr. Papworth make any

rental payments to Mr. Wilson for the property.
Prior to the attempted assumption Weyerhaeuser had foreclosed and sold the property in question under the terms of its deed
of trust with Scott.

At the time of the representations made in the
3

beneficiary statement, as well as at the time of the attempted transfer from Scott to Wilson, the deed of trust had already been foreclosed.

As a result of this foreclosure, Weyerhaeuser held all title to

the property in question—Scott no longer owned anything and could
no transfer any interest to Wilson..
Some time after the attempted closing Empire was contacted by
attorneys for Wilson demanding substantial damages.

After ex-

tended negotiations, Empire and Wilson settled and Wilson assigned
all his interests to Empire.

Subsequent thereto this action against

Weyerhaeuser was filed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At all times relevant to this litigation Weyerhaeuser owned all
interests in the subject property.

By having sold and purchased the

property under a power of sale in the deed of trust, Weyerhaeuser
had terminated all interests in the property other than its own.
Despite the fact that Weyerhaeuser had foreclosed the property, it made representation to Empire that it would allow assumption of the "deed of trust"—a deed of trust that no longer existed—by
payment tendered in the amount of $5,473.04.

Weyerhaeuser's offer

to accept payment of this amount for assumption of the deed of trust
was made in a written beneficiary statement.

In reliance on the rep-

resentations made in the beneficiary statement, Empire tendered a
check to Weyerhaeuser (addendum B, record on appeal at page 5) in
the amount requested.

Because the check was drawn by Empire, and

all of the arrangements between Weyerhaeuser and Empire were
made with Empire, Empire has a cause of action in its own right
4

against Weyerhaeuser, in addition to the claims that it derives as assignee from Wilson.
The beneficiary statement, and the tendered check are the
written offer and acceptance of that offer between the parties.

The

offer and the check form the written agreement between Empire and
Weyerhaeuser,,

As the obligation arises from these writings—and

from nowhere else—this litigation arises directly from an agreement
in writing and is subject to the six-year statute of limitation.
Because Wilson received no interest in the attempted transfer
of property, and because he never used or occupied the land, he
owes nothing to Weyerhaeuser.

Because Wilson can owe nothing to

Weyerhaeuser, it is not entitled to an offset against the amount it
rightfully must refund to Empire.
The dispute between the parties can be resolved without the
joinder of additional parties.
with the holdover tenant.

Empire is not in privity of any type

Litigation concerning the rents owed by

the tenant is between Weyerhaeuser and the tenant and does not
affect this litigation.

Similarly, Scott, the former owner, is not neces-

sary to this litigation as a cause of action against him for misrepresentation is independent of this attempted assumption.
Finally, Empire's relationship with its errors and omissions carrier is not of concern to Weyerhaeuser as Weyerhaeuser, under the
collateral source rule, is not entitled to credit for amounts paid by
the errors and omissions carrier.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
EMPIRE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM WEYERHAEUSER IN
ITS OWN RIGHT, AS WELL AS AS ASSIGNOR OF THE RIGHTS OF WILSON
Weyerhaeuser asserts in its brief that Empire's claims for return of the $5,473.04, are derivative from Wilson only, and that because they are derivative, Empire is subject to the defenses that
Weyerhaeuser could assert against Wilson.

Interestingly, at page 13

of its brief, Weyerhaeuser indicates that the arrangement for the assumption of the loan was between Empire and Weyerhaeuser, and
that "Wilson was not even identified on the Beneficiary Statement or
the check."
This litigation resulted from Weyerhaeuser's failure to inform
Empire that Weyerhaeuser's loan on the subject property had been
foreclosed.
assume.

Because of the foreclosure, there was no loan available to
Empire relied upon that representation, a representation

made in writing by Weyerhaeuser, in advising its client, Wilson, of
what was required to effect assumption.

By indicating to Empire

what it would require to allow assumption of the loan, Weyerhaeuser
contracted with Empire to accept tender of the listed amount through
September 15, 1982.

When Empire tendered its check in the amount

requested, the offer had been accepted and the contract made.

At

that point the contract did not concern Wilson, as the parties were

6

Empire and Weyerhaeuser.

Because of Weyerhaeuser's misrepre-

sentation, Empire incurred liability .

That liability is an independent

cause of action, not subject to defenses that Weyerhaeuser may have
against Wilson.
Assuming, however, that Empire is subject to Weyerhaeuser's
defenses against Wilson, as will be discussed in detail in Points III
and IV of this brief, Weyerhaeuser failed to prove that it had any
defenses against Wilson. By failing to so prove, it is not entitled to a
set off against the amount owed to Empire.

POINT II
EMPIRES CLAIM AGAINST WEYERHAEUSER WAS NOT BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION
Empire's remittance of a check in the amount of $5473.04
(Addendum B, Record on Appeal at p. 5.) was made in reliance on the
beneficiary statement received from the defendant, Weyerhaeuser
mortgage company.

In the beneficiary statement Weyerhaeuser in-

cluded the information on the loan that was to be assumed, with the
following additional information:
Past due installments as of 08-26-82 3.621.00.

Addi-

tional late charged will be due at 4.26 for each payment
more than 14 days late.
shortage

51.96.

Assumption fee 45.00.

Reserve

Loan payments must be brought and

kept current during this escrow as loan activity will continue.

Your remittance must include all charges and costs

listed on this statement.
lowing:

In addition, we require the fol-

1. A copy of the recorded deed or other legal

document showing the conveyance of title from our present mortgagor to the new owner.

2. Evidence of insur-

ance in favor of the new owner. If a new policy is being
substituted, the original policy or binder must be submitted upon closing.

3.

The enclosed information form

must be completed and returned along with copies of the
buyers and sellers closing statements. * * *
The form concluded by indicating that the following amounts
were "needed":
$3,621.00

5/81 to 9/82

72.42

billed late charges

45.00

transfer fee

51.96

reserve shortage

1,682.66

BANKRUPTCY FEES

$5,473.04
The form was dated "8/27/82" and was signed by Lucille R.
Sontistella (sp.).

The expiration date of the beneficiary statement

was September 15, 1982.

Empire's check in the amount of $5,743.04

was dated September 13, 1982.
Weyerhaeuser asserts that this beneficiary statement, and the
subsequent check tendered in reliance thereon do not qualify as
"writings" for the purposes of Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, because they are not a "contract."
Our Supreme Court in Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490,
80 P.2d 471 (1938), stated that an obligation "founded on an instrument in writing" is one that "grows out of the written instruments."
8

Further, when an obligation is established by the writing, "a promise
to pay or to perform is implied. By necessary inference of law and
fact such promise is embodied in the language of the writing although it may not be expressed in words." Bracklein. at 476.
(emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court further illustrated the principles underlying the "instrument in writing" rule in Evans v. Pickett Brothers
Farms. 28 Utah 2d 125, 499 P.2d 273 (1972). In Pickett the parties
to the litigation had made an oral agreement for land levelling work
to be performed by the plaintiff.

After the work had been com-

pleted, the defendant caused a written form to be prepared by the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service.

The form was

entitled a "purchase order" and authorized the vendor to furnish the
farmer with the conservation materials or services described.

The

form indicated the acreage involved and that the sales price was $10
per hour.

Thereafter the defendant signed and dated the form.

In holding that the six-year statute of limitation applied, the
court indicated that the instrument was sufficient to imply a promise
to pay, and qualified as an instrument in writing.
In the instant case the beneficiary statement included all of the
terms that the defendant, Weyerhaeuser, required for assumption of
the loan.

Empire met those requirements.

However, Weyerhaeuser

did not have anything to sell to Empire as the loan in question had
already been foreclosed.

As Weyerhaeuser was unable to perform

under the terms of the agreement, it must certainly be implied into
the agreement between the parties that Weyerhaeuser would return
the amount tendered.

The beneficiary statement is the foundation of
9

the transaction between the parties.

It defined the terms of as-

sumption, and expressed the amount of consideration required for
consummation.
In Evans an instrument that was executed between the government agency and the defendant, without any input from the
plaintiff, without his signature, and after he had performed his part
of the agreement, was deemed a sufficient writing to invoke the provisions of the six-year statute of limitation.

It stretches reason to ar-

gue that the instrument involved here, between the parties directly
and stating the terms of the agreement, does not also qualify as "an
action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing."

(Section 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated.)

Weyerhaeuser erroneously argues that the beneficiary statement lacked the specificity necessary to form a contract.

What they

actually mean is that Weyerhaeuser was not able to perform its obligations under the agreement, because no obligation existed at that
point in time that could be assumed.

The necessary "meeting of the

minds" occurred—Empire and its client would assume the mortgage
upon payment of the amount demanded by Weyerhaeuser in the
beneficiary statement.

Empire performed; Weyerhaeuser could not.
POINT III

WILSON HAD NO OBLIGATION TO MAKE PAYMENTS ON A DEED OF
TRUST THAT NO LONGER EXISTED
In its discussion on point III, Weyerhaeuser takes the interesting position that Wilson's failure to make payments on the deed of
trust relieves Weyerhaeuser from returning the monies that had
been tendered to it to assume the deed of trust.
10

Of course, had there

actually been a deed of trust to assume in existence at the time of
the attempted assumption, this litigation would not have arisen.

Had

Wilson failed to pay the obligations under the deed of trust, Weyerhaeuser could have exercised its power of sale and foreclosed on the
property, extinguishing all interest Wilson would have had.

That ob-

viously could not take place because Weyerhaeuser already owned
ALL interests in the property as a result of its previous foreclosure
sale.

Wilson could not be expected to make payments on an obliga-

tion that did not exist.
To illustrate the nonsensical nature of Weyerhaeuser*s argument, one need only move the time of the discovery of the previous
sale to a couple of days after the attempted assumption had been
concluded.

Suppose Wilson, at that point, discovered that he actually

had received absolutely nothing for the money that he had paid to
Weyerhaeuser—he had no title whatever to the property he thought
he had purchased.

Having so discovered his lack of ownership, he

refused to pay the payments Weyerhaeuser demanded on the deed
of trust that had already been foreclosed.

Applying the argument

that Weyerhaeuser now presents to this court, Wilson's failure to
make even the first payment on a non-existent deed of trust would
permit Weyerhaeuser to retain the $5,473.04 it had received, and
the title to the property.
Section 57-1-28, Utah Code Annotated, provides, in relevant
part
The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to
the purchaser, without right of redemption,
the trustee's title and all right, title, interest,
11

and claim of the trustor and his successors in
interest and of all persons claiming by,
through, or under them, in and to the property sold. . . .(emphasis added.)
After the foreclosure sale that antedated the attempted assumption, Mr. Wilson's predecessors, under the provisions of the
above-cited statute, had no interest to convey to him.

Despite receipt

of their deed, he received no interest whatever in any property.
Weyerhaeuser's exercise of its power of sale on the property extinguished the deed of trust and left nothing for Mr. Wilson to assume.
Thompson on Real Property, Section 4814, p. 672. Because he had
actually purchased no property, and could not assume a deed of trust
that had been extinguished by sale, he had no obligation to pay any
money to Weyerhaeuser.
Interestingly, Weyerhaeuser cites two cases, McCarren v. Merrill. 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964) and Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 271, 508 P.2d 536 (1973), as authority for the proposition that they are excused from returning the
money tendered to them by Wilson's failure to make mortgage payments.

Indeed, these cases do stand for the proposition that perfor-

mance by one party to a contractual arrangement is excused by the
nonperformance of the other party.

Weyerhaeuser fails to apply the

cases to the proper time frame in this transaction, however.

Implicit

in the beneficiary statement upon which payment was made was
that a deed of trust still existed to be assumed.

By sending the ben-

eficiary statement to Empire, Weyerhaeuser so represented.
deed of trust existed.

No such

At that point, Weyerhaeuser had breached the
12

assumption agreement.

That breach, according to the reasoning in

the cases cited by Weyerhaeuser, excused Wilson from any further
performance under the agreement.

All that was left was for Weyer-

haeuser to return the consideration for the assumption it had no legal right to accept.
POINT IV
WEYERHAEUSER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO AN
OFFSET AGAINST THE AMOUNT OWING TO EMPIRE
Weyerhaeuser argues that Wilson, and subsequently Empire,
are liable for the unpaid mortgage payments, or for the fair rental
value of the property, and that these amounts should be offset
against the amount to be returned by Weyerhaeuser.

Weyerhaeuser

made claim for these amounts in its counterclaim to the Plaintiffs
complaint.

The court, however, held that Weyerhaeuser had failed to

prove the allegations of its complaint, and dismissed the same.
To be able to sustain a claim for offset under Section 349 of the
Restatement of Contracts, as Weyerhaeuser attempts to do, it must
prove that Wilson or Empire "received any interest in land or goods
or any other property in exchange for his own performance."

It is

amply clear that Wilson received no interest whatever in the property, so he, and subsequently Empire, can owe nothing on that account.
Secondarily, Weyerhaeuser argues that Wilson and Empire are
responsible for the fair rental value of the property.

To maintain

that claim Weyerhaeuser would have to show that Wilson or Empire
had come into actual possession of the property.

Weyerhaeuser did

not produce any testimony or other evidence to show that Wilson
13

had ever occupied or had any use whatever of the property whatever.

By failing to so prove, Weyerhaeuser failed to prove the ele-

ments of its counterclaim for set off, and the counterclaim was property dismissed.
The property in question was actually occupied by a holdover
tenant, Mr. Papworth.
Mr. Papworth.

Mr. Wilson received no rental payments from

Because Mr. Papworth had possession of the property

during the time in question, it is to him that Weyerhaeuser should
look for payment for the rental value of the property.

Indeed, Wey-

erhaeuserfiled suit against Mr. Papworth to recover the past rents.
(The Fourth District Court file was introduced in the present ligitation.)
Weyerhaeuser cannot property look to Mr. Wilson to collect the
rental amounts from Mr. Papworth, as there is no enforceable relationship between Wilson and Papworth.

Were Mr. Wilson to bring

suit against Mr. Papworth for the amounts of rent owing, Mr. Papworth could properly seek dismissal of the suit by Mr. Wilson because Mr. Wilson is not the real party in interest.

(The real party in

interest in an action against Mr. Papworth is Weyerhaeuser, the
property owner.

Mr. Wilson owns nothing at all.)

Mr. Wilson and

Mr. Papworth are not in privity of contract, as he is a holdover tenant and any contract he may have passed to Weyerhaeuser and not
to Wilson, and Wilson and Papworth are not in privity of estate, as
Mr. Wilson received no estate in land at all from the Scotts.

14

POINT V
ALL PARTIES NECESSARY FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF THIS CASE
WERE BEFORE THE COURT, AND EMPIRE WAS THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST.
Weyerhaeuser argues that additional parties were necessary
for the fair adjudication of the cause of action claimed by Empire
against them.

Specifically, Weyerhaeuser asserts that P. Scott Con-

struction Company, the grantor to Wilson, and Papworth, the tenant
were indispensable parties.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19, how-

ever, does not require that every conceivable party be joined; rather,
the rule only requires to be joined those whose presence is required
for a full and fair determination of that party's rights as well as the
rights of the other parties to the suit. Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock
Transfer Co.. 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984).
In Cowen the appealing party argued that another entity was
essential to a proper adjudication of the case.

The court explained

that the purpose of the rule is "to guard against the entry of judgments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence." Cowen. at 114. (The court held that the party sought to be
necessary by the appealing side was not indispensable.)
In the action before this court the only issue under consideration is whether or not Weyerhaeuser is entitled to retain the monies
it received from Empire on behalf of Wilson. That claim can be fully
adjudicated without reference to Papworth, the holdover tenant.

In-

deed, Weyerhaeuser has shown by filing suit against Papworth without joining Wilson or Empire, that the dispute concerning the rental
15

value of the property occupied by Papworth is between him and
Weyerhaeuser, and does not concern Wilson or Empire.

Federal Gas,

Oil & Coal Co. v. Cassadv, 56 F. Supp 824 (ED Ky 1943).
In the same vein, any claim against Scott for misrepresentation
in the purchase does not affect the claims that Empire has against
Weyerhaeuser—the claims are entirely separate.

A judgment against

Weyerhaeuser does not affect the rights of Scott, nor does a judgment in Scott's absence affect the rights of Weyerhaeuser.
Additionally, if Weyerhaeuser feels that Scott has some liability
for the amounts that Weyerhaeuser must return to Empire, Weyerhaeuser could have brought him in through third-party practice.
Weyerhaeuser also argues that Empire is not the real party in
interest, but that Empire's errors and omission carrier, Shand Morahan & Company, was the real party in interest.

The nature of the

relationship between Shand Morahan and Empire is not of concern to
Weyerhaeuser.

Weyerhaeuser's attempt to have Shand Morahan

converted into a real party in interest because it covers Empires
losses breaches the collateral source rule.
In Dubois v. Nve. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978) our Supreme Court
explained that "defendants cannot avoid liability on the ground that
the damage had been paid for by the insurance company.

The collat-

eral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to have
damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff
has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss
from an independent collateral source."
For Shand Morahan to be deemed the real party in interest in
this litigation, Weyerhaeuser would have to show that, under the
16

terms of the insurance agreement between Empire and Shand Morahan, Shand Morahan receives absolute subrogation for the losses that
it pays.

Weyerhaeuser introduced no such evidence, and never at-

tempted to obtain the same through regular discovery.

Without evi-

dence that Shand has any interest in the litigation at all beyond its
payment on behalf of Empire as a collateral source, Shand is not a
real party in interest.
Should by some chance Shand Morahan file suit against Weyerhaeuser to also recover the amounts in question here, Shand would
be subject to Weyerhaeuser's defenses against Empire, from which
Shand would derive all of its recovery rights.

Payment would obvi-

ously be an absolute defense.
POINT VI
EMPIRE PROVED ITS ALLEGATIONS WITH THE REQUISITE SPECIFICITY
Weyerhaeuser asserts that the damages Empire seeks to collect
were speculative, and for that reason not recoverable.

Specifically,

Weyerhaeuser claims that Empire did not establish that Wilson actually paid any money to Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company, or that
Empire paid all of the money for which it seeks reimbursement.
Weyerhaeuser, in its answer to Plaintiffs complaint (Record on Appeal at page 99) admits that it received Empire's check in the amount
of $5473.04, and further admits that it negotiated the check and kept
the funds.

Those admissions, coupled with the fact that no deed of

trust existed to be assumed, present the prima facie case.

Whether

the funds in question came from Wilson or any other source is not
essential to the outcome of the case—the amounts were tendered to
17

Weyerhaeuser by Empire, and it is Empire that seeks their return in
this action.

Additionally, as explained previously, Empire is under no

obligation to explain where it got the money to reimburse Wilson.
Empire is the real party in interest and the reimbursement source is
not an issue in this litigation.
POINT VII
EMPIRE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES EXPENDED IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST WEYERHAEUSER
The Court's judgment in this litigation included a provision that
will allow Empire to recover from Weyerhaeuser attorneys' fees that
are expended in the execution of the judgment rendered.

There is no

award for attorney's fees expended prior to the entry of the judgment.
Attorney's fees on an execution of a judgment should be considered necessary costs incurred in the enforcement of the judgment
and, for that reason, should be the responsibility of the party whose
refusal to pay the judgment already rendered necessitates the execution proceeding.

In the current case, Weyerhaeuser can avoid all

liability for the award of attorney's fees by simply paying the judgment without forcing Empire to resort to execution proceedings.
Both the Third Circuit and the Fourth District Court rules permit
the recovery of attorney's fees for executions in the case of default
judgments.

(Fourth District Administrative Order 23, Third Circuit

Rules H-87-l:4).

If attorneys' fees accrued in collection of a default

judgment are permissible, they must also be permissible in collection
of a judgment obtained after trial.
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CONCLUSION
Empire's complaint against Weyerhaeuser was based upon the
contents of the beneficiary statement prepared by Weyerhaeuser.
Because this was an action based on a writing it fell within the coverage of the six year statute of limitation.

The deed of trust that Em-

pire attempted to assume was no longer in existense at the time of
the attempted assumption.

Wilson, Empire's client, never took pos-

session or had the use of the subject property—it was continuously
occupied by a holdover tenant who made no payments to Wilson.
For these reasons Empire requests that the judgment of the Court
below be affirmed by this Court and the cause dismissed.

Respectfully

submitted,

H.
MARK F.ROBINSON
CLAUDE E. ZOBELL, JR.
Attorneys for Empire Title Company.
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